Four years after the invasion of Ukraine, Romanians’ perception of the war has changed significantly, with only half saying Russia is to blame and less than half willing to help. Security analyst Nicolae Țibrigan explains what happened.
According to the INSCOP survey published the other day, only 54.9% of Romanians consider Russia responsible for starting the war in Ukraine, down from 71% in 2022.
14.1% point to Ukraine as the culprit (compared to 4.5% in May 2022 and 8.8% in November 2023), 7.7% – the USA (compared to 10.4% in May 2022 and 14.6% in November 2023), 9% – the European Union (compared to 1.7% in May 2022 and 2.9% in November 2023) and 3.5% – others.
The PSD, PNL and USR voters believe that Russia is to blame for starting the war. I think that Ukraine is particularly guilty: PSD and AUR voters, people with primary education. Especially AUR voters believe that the EU is to blame for starting the war, the survey reveals.
As far as supporting Ukraine is concerned, 42.6% of the respondents think that Romania should not offer any kind of aid. 31.5% of the survey participants believe that, in order to resist Russia’s aggression, Romania should offer Ukraine humanitarian aid. Only 10.5% are of the opinion that we should offer military aid and 12.2% – financial aid.
Asked about the end of the conflict in Ukraine, 35.4% of the survey participants believe that, in order to stop the war, Ukraine should make concessions to Russia (compared to 24.5% in November 2023). 53.3% believe that Russia should withdraw and return the territories to Ukraine (compared to 64.7% in November 2023).
Why perceptions of the war in Ukraine have changed
Nicolae Țibrigan, communication expert and co-founding president of the New Data Academy organization, explains that the change in perceptions is compatible with two major processes: geopolitical reassessment and psychological self-defense mechanisms.
If at the beginning of the war, the reaction of the Romanians was clear: there was a victim and an aggressor, after four years, we are facing a wear and tear of perceptions, says the expert. “War no longer causes shock, but fatigue. And fatigue is fertile ground for relativization and divergence of opinion”he explains.
From a sociological perspective, in this phase responsibility becomes diffuse. The moral clarity with which the aggressor was identified gave way to “more complex” explanations fueled by external propaganda.
The wave of alternative explanations, conspiracy theories or simplified geopolitical frameworks has saturated the information environment and favored the belief that “truth is complicated”.
“There is a self-perception that the great powers decide and we are not even invited to the table“, the analyst explains. This vision reduces the feeling of control and responsibility. If global decisions are taken elsewhere, the involvement seems useless. Thus, almost half of Romanians believe that we should not give aid to Ukraine.
In parallel, a well-known psychological self-defense mechanism intervenes: “People look for explanations that reduce cognitive dissonance: if you say Ukraine is also to blame, the threat seems smaller and more controllable.” In addition, this relieves you of the aid you owe to the victim. In other words, relativizing Russia’s responsibility reduces the anxiety generated by the proximity of war.
The dominant factor: social fatigue. Followed by pessimism and cognitive warfare
After four years of conflict, social fatigue becomes the dominant factor in changing attitudes towards war, says Țibrigan: “The fatigue is filtered through the immediate local issues that people are facing. To me, this is a dominant structural factor and has the greatest influence. After 4 years, the war has become a permanent background, the public attention has decreased, there is this desire for a quick end to the war. This is where the pro-Trump sympathy of a segment of the electorate comes from.”
The so-called “anxious pragmatism”, the desire to end the war as quickly as possible, regardless of the method chosen, is growing. In this context, “public opinion becomes more prone to relativization. The population does not become pro-Russian, but fatigue reduces the intensity of the moral framework.” This is actually the goal of the Kremlin, which does not want Western societies to become pro-Russian, but to have “a fog effect in which everything, including the objective causes of this war, is relativized. That Russia is not necessarily to blame, that everyone is to blame, so practically no one is to blame, that this is what happened, that the Ukrainians are Russians, that there is no point in prolonging this war, that the West also has its share of the blame. All this relativization explains this change of attitude”.
In second place in terms of the change of attitude of the Romanians, says the specialist, is the pessimism regarding the results of the war. “The fact that 44.5% of Romanians believe that Russia will win the war influences moral judgment and affects the availability of support. Accepting concessions becomes more likely when people believe the outcome is inevitable“says the expert. The perception of the inevitability of losing the war reduces the willingness to make sacrifices.
“People saw that the Russian Federation had some progress that was presented as decisive, although from 2022 until now they only occupied about 1.46% of Ukrainian territory“, he points out.
In third place in terms of attitude change is information fragmentation and cognitive warfare. “Cognitive warfare combines propaganda and disinformation and aims to win our hearts and minds. It is played out at the level of large collectives. Here the propaganda is not to convince the maj, but to produce doubt, narratives that everyone is guilty, promote ambiguity and messages like ‘see you might be in our sights’, ‘if you are neutral you are more won’, you can also get some territories'”.
The last Eurobarometer showed that only 31% of Romanians see disinformation as a major danger, below the European average of 40%. “In such societies with low cognitive resilience, Russian propaganda has a strong chance. However, the three aspects mentioned, war fatigue, pessimism about Ukraine’s victory and cognitive warfare are interconnected. Distrust in institutions also plays a role here”.
“Limited moral solidarity”: empathy without commitment
The data show that Romanians prefer humanitarian aid over military or financial aid. Țibrigan calls this attitude: “a kind of limited moral solidarity.“
He explains: “We stand in solidarity with the victims, but we keep a reserve. We maintain a positive moral identity without taking perceived risks.”
This is a form of empathy that does not involve strategic costs or security risks.
Although Western leaders, as well as most analysts, repeat that Ukraine defends the eastern flank of Europe, the message is not internalized by the population.
Țibrigan emphasizes: “Today, Europe’s frontier starts in Lisbon and ends in the trenches of Ukrainian soldiers”. However, only a minority of those who answered the survey questions perceive the war as directly related to Romania’s security. Main reason: “We don’t have a security culture.”
Țibrigan specifies that Romanian institutions have not clearly defined essential concepts such as hybrid war, and without security literacy the public remains vulnerable. “Without security literacy, the Romanian public will remain easily influenced.”
Political role and the polarization of narratives
The analyst observes an overlap between perceptions of the war and electoral preferences. “Politically Promoted Narratives Influence Public Perceptions.” Anti-Western or geopolitically ambiguous messages can amplify mistrust and confusion.
The change in Romanians’ attitude towards the war in Ukraine is not the result of a single factor. It is the product of a combination of social fatigue, propaganda, collective anxiety, lack of security education and institutional distrust, the expert claims.
As Nicolae Tîbrigan warns: “Without security literacy and strategic communication, society remains vulnerable.”
In an age of information warfare, understanding the conflict becomes as important as its evolution on the front. Romania is not only on the brink of war, but also in the middle of a battle for perceptions, truth and democratic resilience.
